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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
- - - - - - - -
BETTY L. KESSIMAKIS, 
* 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ,, 
VS. 
* CASE NO. 15387 
DALE M. KESSU1AKIS, 
* 
Defendant-Appellant. 
* 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a district court rul~ng wherein the 
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake CountY refused 
appellant's request to modify the divorce decree and awarded 
judgment against appellant for unpaid support, alimony and debts 
he was previously ordered to pay, and further found the appellant 
to be in contempt of court for failure to make the said payments. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOvffiR COURT 
The district court denied appellant's request to modify the 
original decree of divorce, entered judgment against him for 
$16,391.40 for past due alimony, support money, mortgage pavments, 
unpaid debts and attorney's fees and found him in contempt of 
court for his failure to make the said payments, which judgment 
was rendered pursuant to the respondent's Order to Show Cause. 
RELIEF SQUC:HT ON APPEAL 
Appellant is seeking a modification of the decree, which 
modification would allow him a reasonable time to make up the 
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arrearages and to suspend further accrual of alimony and suppc: 
while the arrearages are being satisfied. 
PRELIMINARY STATEHENT 
"R" stands for record. "TR" stands for transcript of recor 
STATD1ENT OF FACTS 
The respondent filed a com~laint for divorce in the Thirc 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on 
April 22, 1974 (R 1) and an Amended Complaint was subsequent\>! 
filed in Hay 9, 1974 (R 8). A Decree of Divorce was subsequent: 
made and entered on August 28, 1974 wherein, among other thin£; 
the appellant was ordered to pay to the respondent $200 per mer 
as alimony, $100 per month per child for support of the minor 
children of the parties, and respondent's attorney's fees. The 
respondent was also awarded the real property of the parties 
which was used as the family residence and appellant was furtti 
ordered to pay all of the debts of the parties incurred durin£ 
the course of the marriage, including the assumption and vavme· 
of the mortgage balance on the said real propertY (R 19-21)-
In February of 1975 the appellant filed with the distric: 
court a Hotion to set aside the default divorce on various 
grounds (R 24-25) which motion r.;oas denied on :-!arch 21, 1975. 
104-105). 
Appellant then appealed to this court from the order dee 
the Motion to set aside the dafult divorce (R 108) and in 
February of 1976 this Court affirmed the lower court decisioc 
(R 140-141) 
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After the case had been remitted to the district court 
the appellant petitioned the court to modify the divorce decree, 
alleging inequity in the original decree and a substantial change 
in circumstances which change would justify a modification. 
(R 144, 181-182). 
At approximatelY the same time the respondent petitioned 
the district court for an Order to Show Cause (R 194) demanding 
that the appellant be ordered to show cause why he should not 
have judgment entered against him for various amounts for unpaid 
child support, alimony, mortgage payments, and unpaid debts which 
he had been ordered to pay in the original decree of divorce and 
why he should not be held in contempt of Court and ordered to 
pay attorney's fees (R 194). An Order to Show Cause was subse-
quently issued on respondent's petition (R 202) and an Order to 
Show Cause was also issued on appellant's petition for modification 
(R 188). 
On the 3rd day of t1ay, 19 77 both parties appeared pursuant 
to the respective Orders to Show Cause which had been served 
upon them and which both came on for hearing on said date. Both 
parties appeared before the Court, the Honorable Stewart M. Hansen, 
Jr, presiding. After considering the testimonY and evidence 
presented bv the parties, the Court entered judgment as aforesaid 
and denied appellant's request to modify the decree. 
The appellant, in his brief, recites a long statement as 
to what each partv testified to, which is inaccurate in a number 
of places and contains false or misleading inferences. Aopellant 
alsc delves into an involved repetition of the testimony of the 
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parties which we do not find necessary to do here, but we wi!; 
set forth only the necessary points. 
With regard to the testimony of the appellant, the prima:c 
point of importance and interest is that the appellant testifi; 
that the only change in his income since the time of the decree 
was that he was no longer selling auail (TR 33) and that as a 
matter of fact, his income was higher than it was at the time 
of the decree (TR 33). 
The respondent testified that she had received nothing at 
all from the appellant from the time of the decree until Noveml, 
of 1976 (TR 43,49, 50) and her testimony at the time of the 
default· divorce hearing indicated that his weekly income was 
from $400 to $800 per week (Default Divorce Transcript 5). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT HAS RAISED NEW ISSUES ON APPEAL WHICH CANNOT BE 
DECIDED BY THIS COURT 
The appellant has raised the issue of whether or not the 
decree should be modified to allow him to pay the judgment 
entered below over a period of time and that while doing so, 
the accrual of further alimony and support payment should be 
suspended. This is a new issue and was never raised in the dis:: 
court, either in his pleadings or in the hearing itself. The~ 
time this point was raised was in his aopeal brief wherein he 
states that the relief asked for on appeal is to have the 
d and the Case remanded "with directions to judgment reverse 
d by fl..xl.·ng a reasonable time within which modify the ecree 
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planitiff may be permitted to pay off the judgment for arrearages, 
and suspending the payment of alimony and support monev during 
the payout period." (Appellant's brief l-2) 
This court has refused on manv, many occasions to permit 
the raising of an issue for the first time on appeal. See ~ 
v. Cayias, 431 P2d 788 (Utah 1967); Westerfield v. Coop. Utah, 311 
P2 d 78 7; Dolores Uranium Corporation v. Jones, Utah, 382 P2d 883; 
General Appliance Corporation v. Haw, Inc .. Utah, 516 P2d 346. 
There are many other cases which we could cite but it would 
serve no real purpose since the principle stated is virtually 
a hornbook rule. 
Respondent thus believes this argument should be dispositive 
of the issues before the court, however, in the event the court 
finds merit to the appellant's positions. the following additional 
arguments are submitted for the court's consideration. 
POINT II 
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO REFUSE TO MODIFY THE 
DECREE OF DIVORCE BY DECREASING THE ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT 
PAYMENTS 
It is the well and often stated ~ule in this state that in 
order for a decree of divorce to be modified, the moving or 
petitioning party must show a substantial change in his or her 
circumstances to warrant such a modification. King v. King. Utah, 
478 P2d 492; Anderson v. Anderson. Utah, 368 P2d 264; Gale 
v. Gale, 258 P2d 986. Again, there are manv other cases which 
could be cited to support this position a~d rule. 
It is evidently one of the appellant's contentions that no 
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change is necessary to warrant a change, and he cites 30.3-5 
U.C.A. ( 19 5 J as amended) and the case of Iverson v. Iverson, 
526 P2d 1126 (Utah 1974) in support of this position. In h~s 
brief at page 11, he cites the above cited statute before and 
after the 1969 amendment and the court will note that there is 
little change in the language or meaning as far as modificatk 
is concerned. And with regard to the language used, this cour: 
has repeatedly construed the language to allow the district 
courts to modify the decree if a substantial_ change in circum· 
stances is shown. In Dixon v. Dixon. 240 P2d 1121, 1214 (Utah 
1952) this court noted that the statute " ... has been construe: 
practically since it's enactment, to confer jurisidiction upor. 
the court to make such changes in those cases only where there 
has been a change in the circumstances or condition of a part·' 
since the en try of the original decree." The Iverson case wh:c 
the appellant cites. in no way supports his position that no 
change is necessary. To so hold would mean that the dissatisfi, 
party could circumvent the appellate procedure and have anoche: 
district judge completely vitiate the original decree withou: 
showing a change in circurns tar.ces. This is an erroneous idea 
and without support in the statutes, cases or other authorit:e 
Hith regard ::o the :nerits of the aT!pellant's contention 
that there had been a change in circumstances, it is evident 
from his testimony that the onl:r change was that he no lange: 
sold quail, r,vhich change amounted to Sl,OOO or :navbe $2,00C :e 
vear, (TR 33) and that despite this loss he testified that,. 
income had increased since the time of the decree (TR 33) 
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It is also important to keep in mind that at the time of the decree, 
his weekly income was from $400 to $800 per week (Default Divorce 
Transcript 5). It is also apparent from the hearing as a whole, 
that the appellant is and was receiving substantial "gifts" from 
his father. 
Despite the fact that there was a conflict in some of the 
testimony, the court is not obligated to believe all testimony 
in which there is inherent frailty, including self-interest of 
the witness, People's Finance~ Thrift Company Of Ogden v. Doman, 
497 P2d 17 (Utah 1972). It is also the general rule, that on 
apoeal the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to 
sustain the lower court, and there will be no reversal unless 
from the weight of the evidence it is manifestlY apparent that 
the court misapplied the law to the facts. Hardy v. Hendrickson, 
495 P2d 28 (Utah 1972). 
From the evidence and the authorities cited, it is readily 
apparent that no injustice has been done and that the district 
court's refusal to modify the decree was proper and justified 
in light of the testimony and other evidence presented. Even 
considering the one small change in the appellant's circumstances, 
this I.Jas brought on by himself and he is thus responsible for 
that change. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERROR I~ ADJUDGING APPELLANT r.UILTY 
OF CONTEMPT 
\.Jhen one views the appellant's testimonY from the most 
:avorable light, it is obvious that he had a reasonablY good 
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income, and that despite this he failed to provide any 
support whatsoever to his former wife and his children. (TR 1: 
49-50). Because of this failure on the part of the appellant, 
his wife was forced to go on welfare (TR 43) , court actions 
were filed against her, and she was forced to go without hut 
in the home for five months (TR 45). Doctor and other bills we: 
unpaid, and many other hardships were forced upon her and the 
children because of his refusal to aid and support them. It 
is thus obvious that the contempt finding was justified. 
CONCLUSION 
The original decree in this matter was entered bao 
upon the needs of the family and the ability of the appellant· 
pay. The amounts v1ere totally justified in light of the perioc 
of time that the parties \vere married, the needs of the famil·: 
and his ability to pay. This decision of the district court';a; 
upheld on appeal by this court, and since the decree the onlv 
change in circumstances has been an increase in appe~lant's 
income. Despite the fact that he had income sufficient to pav 
the debts, he failed and refused to pay anvthing to his famil·: 
However, it is still apparent that the onlv issue on this 
appeal is that :he appellant wants to be allowed time to P~ 
the arrearages off while havinf; f•..:rther pavments suspended f::: 
accruing. This is obviousl·r a r.ew idea which was not litiga:i 
or raised in anv manner in the district court. 
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Based upon these arguments and considerations, it is respondent's 
position that this court should affirm the district court's 
ruling. 
Respecfully submitted, 
BRANT H. WALL 
Attorney for Respondent 
Suite 500 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
